New KMT Chairwoman's Stance is Reshaping Taiwan's Politics
United Daily News Commentary, October 21, 2025
After being elected chairwoman of the Kuomintang (KMT), former Legislator Cheng Li-wun immediately reaffirmed the “1992 Consensus” and her opposition to Taiwan independence, while expressing her willingness to visit mainland China and meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Her position continues the line once advocated by former President Ma Ying-jeou, clearly distancing herself from the KMT’s long-dominant “establishment faction,” which has avoided mentioning the “1992 Consensus” or engaging with cross-strait issues. Ms. Cheng aims to return the KMT to a position of strategic clarity—openly acknowledging cross-strait political realities and replacing ambiguity with rational dialogue. This shift marks the KMT’s transition from “tactical defense” to “proactive engagement,” forcing the party—and society—to confront a long-ignored question: How explicit a “One China” position can Taiwan truly accept?
Ms. Cheng packages her cross-strait policy as that of a “peace-maker,” seeking to make the concept of a “Chinese national community” a bridge for political dialogue rather than a unification trap. Beijing responded swiftly: Mr. Xi’s congratulatory message unusually included the phrase “advance national unification,” signaling both expectation and a form of pressure testing. In her reply, Ms. Cheng emphasized “One China with respective interpretations,” invoking “descendants of Yan and Huang” and “shared ethnic sentiment.” Her tone mixed softness with firmness—maintaining the party’s orthodox stance while avoiding an overtly pro-China image. Her main challenge is balancing on this fine line so that “strategic clarity” is not misconstrued as “leaning towards China.”
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration quickly countered. President Lai Ching-te stressed that “peace cannot be built on illusions,” reiterating that peace cannot be achieved through a single agreement nor under the conditions of an aggressor. “The idea that accepting the “1992 Consensus” and the ‘One China’ principle would bring peace is impossible,” President Lai declared. His swift rebuttal revealed his awareness of the mounting pressure from KMT–Communist Party interactions. The DPP’s strategy is to strip the KMT’s “1992 Consensus” of political appeal and reframe “resisting China and protecting Taiwan” as moral legitimacy. The calculation is that the clearer Ms. Cheng’s stance becomes—and the happier Beijing appears—the more uneasy Taiwanese voters will feel.
Yet Taiwan’s public mood is shifting. The once-effective “resist China to protect Taiwan” card is losing traction. The KMT’s willingness to “re-engage with China” also reflects a bid to challenge the dominance of “Taiwan-first” thinking and confront the constitutional and geopolitical reality of the Republic of China. Divisions persist within the blue camp. Avoiding explicit references to “China” and the “1992 Consensus” has long been seen as an electoral pragmatism—but is it really? Ms. Cheng has chosen to take the risk, using linguistic clarity to seize narrative control. Her wager: rather than be labeled “pro-China,” it is better to define what “pro-China” actually means. This approach demonstrates political audacity but carries high risks. If Beijing offers no tangible concessions and Taiwanese public opinion remains unconvinced, Ms. Cheng’s strategy may ultimately be judged as “the right direction at the wrong time.”
On October 20, Chairman Huang Kuo-chang of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) echoed Speaker Han Kuo-yu of the Legislative Yuan that “The Republic of China is our nation, and Taiwan is our home,” adding that defending freedom and democracy is a shared, cross-party goal. Chairman Huang sees the fatigue of Taiwanese society—tired of war anxiety and distrustful of pro-China rhetoric. The TPP’s cautious stance could attract moderate voters from the KMT. This poses a potential threat to Ms. Cheng: she may have initiated the debate but may not be able to dominate it. How the KMT and TPP find common ground while jointly challenging the DPP’s pro-independence narrative remains an open and complex question.
Beijing, for now, is watching. Mr. Xi is in no rush to act, first observing whether Ms. Cheng can withstand domestic pressure. If she stabilizes public sentiment, Beijing might offer symbolic goodwill; if she falters, it will quickly pivot and lower expectations toward the KMT. Washington remains a bystander, focused less on partisan alignment than on whether Taiwan’s democracy can sustain policy stability and predictability.
Ms. Cheng’s election has refocused the KMT’s ideological direction and brought Taiwan’s politics back into a framework of clearer dialogue. Her “strategic clarity” challenges the island’s political comfort zone—forcing society to confront a long-delayed question: In what posture should Taiwan face China? If she succeeds, the KMT could regain strategic leadership; if she fails, it would confirm that Taiwan’s psychological boundary remains dominated by anti-China sentiment. Either way, this experiment will redefine the coordinates of Taiwan’s political future.
From: https://vip.udn.com/vip/story/122365/9083067?from=vipudn_maincate_main2